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Abstract
Subscriber’s Privacy is in a constant conflict with security and accountability providing con-
trols employed for network monitoring activities of service providers and enterprises. This
paper presents the results of the author’s research in the field of distributed network secu-
rity monitoring architectures and the proposal of such a system that incorporates crypto-
graphic protocols and a group signature scheme to deliver privacy protecting, network surveil-
lance system architecture that provides subscriber’s accountability and controlled, revocable
anonymity.
1. Introduction
The internet has grown to become the major means of communication for
economy, industry education, politics as well as for people. It is very important
for the contemporary world but it also brings threats and risks that are exploited
successfully by a new type of cyber criminals. The security monitoring is one
of the essential means of control that allows security individuals to know its
enemy and to counter security threats. Network security monitoring is one of
vital elements that provides visibility and accountability for network owners or
network providers.
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In a nutshell a typical network monitoring system shall satisfy the following
functional requirements:
• acquiring necessary information for operation and maintenance pro-
cesses [1],
• measurement of traffic parameters for service level agreements or qual-
ity of service validation,
• controlling of communication services,
• providing security for network subscribers and network resources,
• providing input for security incident and event management systems [2].
Network traffic monitoring has, however, some serious implications on the
subscriber’s privacy and thus privacy-aware property is very important espe-
cially in the case of the Internet service providers and mobile incumbents. The
authors of PRIsm framework [1, 3] were among the first to address this prob-
lem in the professional literature and they have also put forward appropriate
standardization proposals.
This paper presents a proposal for the privacy mechanism based on the group
signature scheme that drives a network security monitoring system called the
MANSF†. The MANSF provides conditional anonymity for the monitored sub-
jects and provides subject’s accountability in the case of security incident.
2. Privacy Aware Network Monitoring Architecture
The MANSF (Multi-Agent Network Surveillance Framework) is designed for
packet networks running Internet protocol suite and performs distributed pas-
sive network traffic analysis. The passive interception ensures that no alteration
is imposed on the inspected network flows. Packet interception is performed
in key network locations for maximal visibility and accountability (see Fig. 1).
The targeted audience for this platform are Internet service providers, mobile
operators, enterprise security and management teams or the security incident
management organizations. The proposed platform is designed to satisfy secu-
rity monitoring and network measurement goals at the same time with ensuring
that no network subscriber experiences a privacy or anonymity degradation.
Functional requirements with respect to the subscriber’s privacy, have been
satisfied by incorporating the following controls into the design:
• Layered communication architecture that limits interfaces available for
a potential attacker.
• Pseudonyms representing subscribers in the central repository of net-
work events.
†Multi–Agent Network Surveillance Framework
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Fig. 1. Distributed network surveillance architecture.
• Dynamic group signature scheme that allows sensor agents to send
trusted messages anonymously.
• Multilayer distributed data aggregation and normalization are used to
enhance privacy.
• Revocation of anonymity is controlled by the cryptographic mechanism
secured by a secret sharing scheme.
The key elements of architecture are the multi–agent framework, centralized
data repository, management and monitoring and the user interface. The multi–
agent framework consists of autonomous computer agents and supporting nodes
used by agents for registration (Agent Directory) and as the repository of the
topology (Service Directory). Agents are divided into two classes that process
network traffic at different levels of abstraction:
• Agent Collector: network probe and network topology discovery func-
tion.
• Agent Processor: data aggregation and normalization agent that as-
sociates a group of agent collectors.
The Central Repository is a special node that collects network security events
and evidence from collector agents. It also stores the knowledge in a form of
frame system that contains network baseline profile and calculated subscriber
profile classes. This knowledge may be further used for detecting anomalies or
characterizing the observed traffic. Evidence data is anonymized and privacy
protected. The Management and Monitoring element is used for system’s op-
erations management. The User Interface is hosting applications for system’s
end–users. The important example of such applications is the Privacy Con-
troller that is the interface for subscribers’ anonymity control and revocation.
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The combined privacy protection controls provide the following properties for
the proposed network surveillance system:
Anonymity: – subscribers retain their privacy as the monitoring system
uses pseudonyms and normalized aggregated data.
Full Traceability: – it is possible to trace back an action to the unique
subscriber.
Unlinkability: – no pseudonym can be linked to the real identity with-
out the proper revocation procedure.
Exculpability: – it is not possible to attribute a given action to a false
source, the revocation of an anonymity is exact and unique.
Unforgeability: – it is not possible to forge a notification attributing a
false action to any source (admissible evidence property).
Revocability: – invertible pseudonymity used for the network monitor-
ing purposes.
Most of those properties is achieved by using an efficient and dynamic group
signature scheme that allows agents to revocably identify a source of network
incident. The group signature scheme used in the MANSF is based on the
robust and rigorously defined BSZ05 [4] scheme that has been extended by the
author with a group member revocation procedure and by the group opening
manager secret key control.
3. Revocable Anonymity Scheme
The key cryptographic primitive delivering anonymity properties which is the
MASF architecture is a dynamic group signature scheme secure with the as-
sumption of existence of trapdoor permutations based on the formal description
and the rigorous security model BSZ05 first proposed in paper [4].
The set of procedures for this scheme consists of the following items: Issue,
Join, Judge, Open, Remove, Sign, Verify, where Remove is an extension
of BSZ05. The key requirement assumed for the group signature construct
is the distribution of group manager roles into the separate modules realized
by different physical servers within the MANSF. Additionally the set of group
signature scheme procedures is partitioned into the public and protected classes
thus limiting the number of the oracles available for a potential attacker in the
internal or external perspective.
It is assumed that the Agent Collector is provisioned in the secure environ-
ment where it is not possible to retrieve the group signature private part of
an agent. It is assumed that the Join and Issue procedures are executed in
a trusted environment. The secrecy of the agent internal structures, which
are retaining sensitive subscriber information, should be also protected by the
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Fig. 2. Revocable Anonymity System’s Architecture.
hardware means of protection. From the operations security perspective, the
separation of duties and restricted console functionality are used to ensure that
agent collector nodes are managed securely.
The key elements of the MANSF group signature framework are the following:
Group Manager: (GM) – that is responsible for the provisioning of
group members and maintenance of the secret database of member
certificates. The Group Manager has a gmsk key used for provision-
ing new members and implements group signature scheme procedures
like Join, Judge, Revoke and Verify. It is located on the Central
Repository and provides the following public services for the multi–
agent framework:
• Verify, used by Agent Processors and the Central Repository to
verify the authenticity of agent collector’s messages,
• Remove, used to disable compromised or decommissioned agent
collector,
• Judge, used by an user–plane application like the Privacy Con-
troller, performing a revocation of subscriber’s anonymity.
Group Opening Manager: (GOM) – implemented on the Agent Di-
rectory. GOM has a key gomk that is used to open a signature and
reveal the identity of the signer. Provides Open procedure and hosts
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the Group Member Revocation List (abbr. GMRL) that is used to ver-
ify whether the signature is issued by an authorized group member
without disclosing the identity of the signer.
Group Controller: (GC) – implemented on the monitoring system of
the MANSF. It is used to decomission an agent collector in the case of
compromise. GC uses the Agent Directory for a reference to the list of
agent collectors and uses the Remove procedure hosted on he Central
Repository.
Group Member: – any agent collector agent within the MANSF multi-
agent platform, implements the Sign procedure.
The Privacy Controller is not a part of the group signature scheme, but it
plays an important role within the MANSF framework. It is an application
layer module responsible for the evidence inspection and subscriber incident
reporting. It may revoke the identity of a subscriber based on the decision of
an operator and the authority responsible for privacy protection.
Agent collectors, the members of the group signature scheme, use the Sign
procedure to authenticate messages broadcast toward their associated agent
processor. In general, the signature is constructed over the digest of the ex-
changed message and the time stamp to record the time of sending a message.
Following the group signature construct proposed in [4], the result of the
Open procedure may be verified with the second procedure Judge that is hosted
on a separate system: the Central Repository. This solution is necessary to
eliminate the scenario when one of the key group signature scheme members,
like GM or GOM, is compromised. The Privacy Controller, aiming at revoking
anonymity of a given subscriber, first follows the Open procedure and then
checks the validity of results with the Judge procedure.
3.1. Scheme Details
Using the BSZ05 [4] proposal as the basis, let ρ1 and ρ2 are the NP relations
over the domain D and (P1, V1), (P2, V2) are the NIZK proofs for those relations
and k ∈ N be the security parameter. Let DS = (Sign, V er) be a digital sig-
nature scheme, ES = (Encrypt,Decrypt) be the public key encryption scheme
and Hk() is the k–bit message digest, as defined in the BSZ05. In addition
to the base scheme cryptographic primitives this proposal extends it with the
following items:
• public key infrastructure certificate authority on the Agent Directory
with the public key KAD and the private key K
−1
AD that issues certifi-
cates certname,
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• secure the secret sharing scheme SSEC = (Compose, n, k), where
Compose is the procedure that takes k key parts out of total n in
order to derive a secret key value that is protected,
• GMRL list of revoked group members that contains the following
records: (TKi, Tr), where the token TKi is the revocation token of
an agent agi of index i, created during the Join procedure and Tr is
the time when revocation happened.
• a message digest function Hash used for revocation token integrity
protection and satisfying the requirements of the PKI scheme.
The setup phase of the group signature scheme is identical with the base
scheme proposal except for the initialization of the additional elements that
extend the original scheme.
Procedure 3.1 Group Signature Scheme Setup
R1 ← {0, 1}ρ1 ; R2 ← {0, 1}ρ2 ; R3 ← {0, 1}k;
(pke, ske) ← Ke(1k, re), re is a random value
(pks, sks) ← Ks(1k);
gpk ← (1k, R1, R2, R3, pke, pks), group public key
gmsk ← (sks), group manager key
gomk ← SSEC(ske, re), GOM private key protected with the secret sharing scheme
certGPK ← (gpk, Tc, E(K−1AD : Hash(gpk, Tc))), group manager certificate
certGMRL ← (R3, Tc, E(K−1AD : Hash(R3, Tc))), GMRL certificate
GMRL ← ∅
The Group Manager and Group Member Revocation List certificates are is-
sued and signed by the certificate authority that is implemented in the agent
directory of the MANSF multi-agent framework. The public key of the Agent
Directory PKI service does not belong to the group signature scheme. In detail,
the agent verifying the group signature uses the Verify oracle located on the
central repository and it has to validate the integrity of the gpk or the response
from the GMRL service by inspecting an appropriate certificate. The mere cer-
tificate’s validity is checked using the self-signed certificate of the Certification
Authority of the MANSF platform. This certificate is also provided by the
agent directory node.
Table 1 outlines the cryptographic attributes used by different types of group
signature scheme members. The square bracket denotes a variable of type array
and table[i] denotes the i-th element of that array.
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Table 1. Data structures used by members of the group signature scheme.
Role Data Structures
Agent Directory Agents[i] = (pki, sigi, certi, agcid, Tc, rsigi)
GMRL[i] = (i, Tc, Tr, TKi)
V alidTokens[i] = Hash(TKi)
gomk
Central Repository (gmsk, pks)
Agent Collector (pki, ski, certi, TKi)
The notation used in the cryptographic attributes descriptions is as follows:
(pki, ski) : public and private key of a given agent collector instance
certi : certificate of agent i generated during the provisioning
agcid : agent collector’s id, reference to the Agent Collector table
Tc : table entry creation time stamp
Tr : revocation entry creation time stamp entry.time revoked
RTi : revocation token generated for a group member in Join
TKi : revocation token generated for a group member in Sign
Hash(TKi) digest of a revocation token
rsigi : revocation token signed by the agent i
pke : public key of the group opening manager
(ske, re) private key of the group opening manager
The exchange of messages in the join procedure is done only between applica-
tions during the provisioning procedure and it is not traversing the multi-agent
communication network. The secret key generation procedure is according to
the BSZ05 model assumed as trusted. The adversary cannot see the result of
generation procedure. The appropriate security controls have to be deployed
to satisfy this functional requirement.
The signature generation, the Sign procedure, is used by an agent collector
instance to prove authenticity of the anonymous message it is distributing. An
agent collector sends also its revocation token RGMRL to claim its revocation
status.
Verification of the revocation status for the group signature’s owner is imple-
mented by the GMRL procedure. The Group Member Revocation List (GMRL)
is the database of all revoked agents which is used to check whether the signer
has a right to sign in a given point of time. The time stamp is used to record
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Procedure 3.2 Join & Issue Group Procedure
The agent collector generates a key pair (pki, ski) ← Ks(1k) and signs it to produce
sigi ← E(ski : pki). It also creates a revocation token RTi ← (R3, Ta) and creates its
signature rsigi ← E(ski : R3, Ta). Both items are sent to the Central Repository that
is the Group Manager:
AGi → CR : E(KCR : (pki, sigi, RTi, rsigi), Ta, Na,Kr)
The Agent Directory verifies the signatures sigi and sigR before continuing the
procedure. When signatures match it generates the certificate
certi ← Sign(sks : (i, pki)) and formulates the response [4]. The response from the
central repository agent is encrypted with the challenge Kr proposed by the agent
collector:
CR → AGi : E(Kr : (i, pki, sigi, certi), Na, Tc, E(K−1CR : Hash((i, pki, sigi, certi), Na, Tc)))
CR → AD : E(KCD : agent = (i, pki, sigi, certi, agcid, Tc, TKi), E(K−1CR : H(agent)))
The Agent Directory receives the new agent collector registration information and
populates Agents[. . .] the table with the new entry. Additionally, the list of valid
tokens V alidTokens[. . .] is appended with the digest of the revocation token. The
variable TKi is discarded after making the digest out of it. The revocation token is
protected by the key gomk and secure secret sharing scheme in order to limit the
possibility in using the token for traffic analysis by the corrupted Agent Directory:
(R3, Ta) ← RTi
TKi ← Encrypt(pke : R3, Ta)
Agents[i] ← (i, pki, sigi, certi, agcid, Tc, rsigi)
V alidTokens[. . .] ← Hash(TKi)
Procedure 3.3 Sign procedure GSig(gpk,m)
Hk(m) is a k-bit message digest function run on the original message m being signed.
TKi ← Encrypt(pke : R3, Ta)
RGMRL ← E(KAD : TKi, Ts, Na)
hm ← Hk(m,RGMRL, Ts)
sgn ← Sign(ski : hm); r ← {0, 1}k
c ← Encrypt(pke : (i, pki, certi, sgn), r)
π1 ← P1(R1, (pke, pks, hm, c), (i, pki, certi, s, r))
return (π1, c, Ts, RGMRL)
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 9/25/15 2:53 PM
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 20:41:03
UM
S
110 Krystian Baniak
a time since when the signatures issued by a given member are treated as non
trusted. In general, the GMRL procedure is a service implemented on the agent
directory node. The agent directory is also the owner of the Open procedure.
The revocation check procedure takes a revocation token RGMRL as the pa-
rameter and the time Ts to verify that it is consistent with the time stamp
embedded in the encrypted token. The token is always sent in an encrypted
form protected with random nonces and a time stamp to ensure that given
transmitted token is always fresh for a particular agent. This technique is used
to protect anonymity of the group signature member and security of the whole
scheme. This procedure also verifies that the revocation token value belongs to
the valid group member by consulting the V alidTokens[. . .] table.
Procedure 3.4 Revocation status check procedure GMRL(gpk, Ts, RGMRL))
This procedure uses the object notation for the entries of the GMRL CRL table.
(TKi, Ta, Na) ← E(K−1AD : RGMRL)
If Ta = Ts return false
Unless V alidTokens.has(Hash(TKi)) then return false
Foreach entry in GMRL[] do
If entry.token = TKi then
If Ta >= entry.time revoked then
return false
End
End
End
return true
The Open procedure is hosted on the Agent Directory of the MANSF plat-
form. This procedure checks whether the signature is correct and then returns
the set of identifiers pointing to the Agent table along with the NIZK proof
verifiable by the Judge procedure. It is necessary to retrieve the secret key ske
that is protected by the secure secret sharing scheme SSEC(N,K), where K
out of N part–key holders are required to commit the procedure.
Judge procedure is used for validation of opening manager output. Opening
manager uses NIZK proof over ρ2 to prove the knowledge of his signing key ma-
terial. This is mandatory procedure in case there is a possibility of disgruntled
opening manager. This concept has been introduced in [5, 4].
Remove procedure is, in fact, applicable for disabling an agent collector in-
stance and populating the GMRL database with the reference to the revoked
agent. The agent entry from the Agents[] table is never erased. This is the
requirement that allows identifying the source of evidence event even after the
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Procedure 3.5 Open procedure Open(gpk, gomk,m, π1, c, Ts, RGMRL)
hm ← Hk(m,Ts, RGMRL)
ske ← Compose(gomk)
(i, pk, cert, s) ← Decrypt(ske : c)
If Agents[i] = NULL or pki = pk then
(pki, sigi) ← Agents[i]
Else return false
If V1(R1, (pke, pks, hm, c), π1) = 0 then return false
π2 ← P2(R2, (pke, c, i, pk, cert, s), (ske, re))
return (i, π2, pki, sigi, cert, c, s)
Procedure 3.6 Judge procedure Judge(gpk, c, i, pk, cert, s)
(pki, sigi) ← Agents[i]
If pki = pk then return false
If V2(R2, (pke, c, i, pk, cert, s), π2) = 0 then return false
If V er(pk : sig) = pki then return false
return true
agent collector is disabled. The entry in the GMRL table consists of two time
stamps, where Tc denotes the entry creation time and the Tr is the time since
when the agent has been regarded as revoked. The Tr time stamp allows an
operator to decide whether formerly issued signatures are also regarded as non
trusted. This kind of functionality allows for more granularity in handling
compromised agent collectors.
Procedure 3.7 Remove procedure Remove(gomk, i, Tr)
CR receives a command to disable agent i from the management station. CR fetches
the revocation token from the agent directory agents database Agents[i] and new
entry is inserted into GMRL table. The token is protected with the gomk so it has to
be decrypted first. It is necessary to retrieve the secret key ske that is protected by
the secure secret sharing scheme SSEC(N,K), where K out of N part–key holders
are required to commit the procedure.:
Tc ← Time.now()
ske ← Compose(gomk)
TKi ← Decrypt(ske : Agents[i].TKi)
entry ← (TKi, T c, Tr)
GMRL[. . .] ← entry
One comment is necessary for the Remove procedure. It becomes evident
that the successful revocation of subscribers identity in MANSF is related to
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the availability of the historic or archive data from agent collectors. In order to
provide the accountability of subscribers an appropriate data retention policy
has to be in place. This entails the retention of regular backups of given agent
collector database of subscribers and pseudonym maps. Those backups have to
be stored outside the multi-agent platform and have to be encrypted with the
secret key also protected with additional means.
The Verify a procedure is used in order to validate the authenticity and
correctness of a group signature. This procedure is implemented on the central
repository and on agent processor agents. The verification is implemented as
the zero knowledge proof check issued by a group member signing the message
m. If the result of the NIZK proof is positive than it is confirmed that the
message, the signing time and the revocation token are issued by a valid group
member. The final check consists of verification of the revocation status of the
signer using the revocation token RGMRL.
Procedure 3.8 Verify procedure V erify(gpk,m, π1, c, Ts, RGMRL)
Hk(m) is a k-bit message digest function run on the original message m that has been
signed by a group member.
(R1, pke, pks) ← gpk
hm ← Hk(m,RGMRL, Ts)
If V1(R1, (pke, pks, hm, c), π1) then
return GMRL(gpk, Ts, RGMRL)
Else return false
4. Proposal’s Security
The group signature scheme relies on the BSZ05 [4] model that, under the as-
sumption of trapdoor permutation’s existence, provides correctness, anonymity,
non–frameability and traceability and delivers a dynamic signature scheme. The
cryptographic primitives implied by this scheme are very complicated and inef-
ficient and thus the mere scheme is not practical. However, the scheme offers a
rigorous and sound formal structure that is a good basis as the reference model.
The BSZ05 scheme also introduces separate roles for the group manager and
opening manager which enhances security by reducing frameability threats.
From the anonymity perspective the scheme ensures that the group signature
cannot be forged which implies the accountability for a group member issuing
a signature.
Group Member Cadence Security Impact. The dynamics of the BSZ05
scheme is delivered in a sense of flexible expanding of the number of group
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members with the use of the Join procedure. The group public key is not
dependent on the group size as the signature is based on the non-interactive
zero knowledge proofs. The BSZ05 scheme is extended with the revocation
mechanism based on the GMRL list (Group Member Revocation List) that is
available via the GMRL oracle to the public requesters without a threat for the
group signature scheme members’ anonymity. The GMRL oracle returns true
or false and the only advantage of the party that verifies the group signature
is the knowledge of the fact that it is issued by a group member during his
cadence. If we assume that GMRL Oracle is only available for the Verify Oracle
that we further limit the knowledge acquired by a potential adversary. In the
worst case the GMRL oracle will not help in reducing the anonymity of the
group member unless the attacker knows the list of revoked agents and thus
the anonymity set can be significantly reduced. In the case if there is only one
revoked member, the identity of the agent may be broken. The corruption of
the Agent Directory allows the adversary to obtain access to the Agents[] table
and to the GMRL[] table and is able to retrieve the group manager opening
key. Taking into account the fact that this key is protected with the secure
secret sharing scheme this type of event requires stakeholders to collude. As
an additional security control, the public key infrastructure is used to protect
integrity and deliver non–repudiation for the group signature message exchange,
like in the case of the GRML procedure.
The signer cadence check, has to have a minimal impact on the information
that may be leaked during the verification process. Therefore the GRML list
contains only the date and time when an agent has been Removed. The lower
bound check is realized as implementation security control in a way where every
message is checked for the time stamp window. When arrival time and creation
time stamps are too distant from the received time stamp that the message has
to be discarded as invalid. Of course, this area may easily become a weakness
if the protocol is not maintained properly.
Architectural Strengths.From the architectural point of view, the security
level is further enhanced with the use of the following concepts related to the
specifics of the MANSF platform:
• Communication platform layering – different procedures are in-
voked over the separate network planes like for instance the Remove
procedure can only be done by the management platform whereas the
Verify procedure may be invoked by any agent processor agent or the
central repository agent.
• Protected group signature procedures – Open and Remove ora-
cles are not available for the attacker in the adversary model of the
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MANSF. Also the GMRL contents are private from the agent directory
perspective.
The adversary model assumes that the Remove oracle is not available for the
multi-agent members. Also the GMRL oracle is only available for the Agent
Directory agent. In the case the Agent Directory is compromised, in normal
conditions when the access to the group opening secret key is not protected,
the anonymity would be broken. In our case the secure secret sharing scheme
removes this weakness.
Weaknesses. Potential weaknesses are concentrated around the corruption
of individual group signature elements. First, the agent collector which is the
group signature scheme member, is a weak point in the case the adversary
hijacks the secret keys used to generate signatures. In such a case a group
member may forge messages until the fact of corruption is detected. The second
weak point is the agent directory that is the group opening manager which
hosts GMRL. The potential adversary may try to get the number of revoked
members, however, it is not possible to deanonymize them without colluding
with the secure secret sharing scheme’s stakeholders.
Efficiency. The original formal BSZ05 model relies on the very complicated
and CPU–intensive cryptographic primitives. For instance the GMR digital
signature scheme that is claimed to be secure under chosen ciphertext attack
(CCA–secure) [4], has in its enhanced form [6] the computation cost comparable
to the RSA (O(log(N))) scheme. This, however, may not be efficient for an
agent analyzing the intensive traffic and which has to produce signatures for
thousands of generated messages. Fortunately, the latest advancements in the
field of pairing based cryptography allow to compose schemes that have constant
size group public keys and short group signatures. The most efficient schemes
that use pairing based cryptography like [7, 8, 9], offer signatures as short as
6–8 group elements of a 520–bit prime order group constructed using an elliptic
curve over a finite field.
Implementation. In the research work, the selection of the group signature
scheme was dictated by the practical application requirements such as compu-
tation cost and the size of the signature domain. The choice was the scheme
using a bilinear map over the prime number elliptic curve finite field. The basis
for the implementation is a version of the GRO07 group signature scheme [8],
which is anonymous under the chosen plain text attack (CPA–anonymous).
The implementation is reinforced with the “PBC library” and the “PBC sig-
nature” libraries that implement the platform for bilinear maps generation and
are easily extensible. The core cryptographic primitive used by [8] and in the
implementation of MANSF group signature is the BB04 [10] short signature.
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5. Conclusions
In conclusion, many existing dynamic group signature schemes may be ex-
tended with a fully dynamic option by adoption of architecture related or exter-
nal techniques like public key cryptography and revocational lists maintained by
one of the group managers. The scheme presented in the MANSF frameworks
also implements this principle with success. The monitoring system is mostly
concerned with maximal subscriber privacy and a verifiable evidence source.
Signature cadence check of the MANSF, realized with the revocation list based
on revocation tokens and protected with secure shared secret scheme intro-
duces minimal impact on the privacy and anonymity of event source. Further
research is, however, needed for ensuring resistance to GMRL Oracle corruption
and ability for an adversary to infer on agent’s identity knowing the date and
time of given agent revocation.
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